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Protecting a Right to Access Internet
Content
THE FEASIBILITY OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT IN
A NON-NEUTRAL NETWORK
INTRODUCTION
If information is a weapon for change, then the Internet
arms every man, woman, and child on the planet. Now more
than ever, the disruptive power of viral mass-communication is
palpable.
The spread of information networks is forming a new nervous
system for our planet. When something happens in Haiti or Hunan,
the rest of us learn about it in real time—from real people. And we
can respond in real time as well. . . . As we sit here, any of you—or
maybe more likely, any of our children—can take out the tools that
many carry every day and transmit this discussion to billions across
the world.1

This cosmopolitan nervous system manifested itself in
early 2011, when the Egyptian citizenry used Facebook to
organize thousands in Tahrir Square to engage in
antigovernment protest.2 As a defensive measure, the Egyptian
government took the rare and startling step of “switching off”
Internet connectivity for its eighty million residents.3
Concurrently, embassy cables disclosed on WikiLeaks
exasperated the uprising in Tunisia when the population

1

Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom
(Jan. 21, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/
135519.htm).
2
Catherine Smith, Egypt’s Facebook Revolution, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11,
2011, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/egypt-facebook-revolutionwael-ghonim_n_822078.html; Ben Wedeman & Amir Ahmed, 3 Dead After Thousand
Protest in Rare Egypt Outpouring, CNN (Jan. 26, 2011, 3:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2011/WORLD/africa/01/25/egypt.protests/index.html.
3
Kyle VanHemert, How Egypt Turned Off the Internet, GIZMODO (Jan. 28,
2011, 3:14 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5746121/how-egypt-turned-off-the-internet.

383

384

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

discovered the “mafia-esque” corruption that yielded “massive
profits” for the nation’s government elite.4
Reliance on Internet connectivity obviously extends well
beyond national protest; reliance presents itself several times
over in varying facets of everyday life, especially in the
nascence of ubiquitous computing. Over a quarter of the
world’s population accesses the Internet.5
Unsurprisingly, an international sentiment has
emerged clearly indicating that Internet access is desired by
all.6 And of course, the public’s sentiment is not powerless: in
June 2009, France’s Constitutional Council denied President
Sarkozy’s power to create an Internet police force and ruled
that Internet access is a basic human right.7 The Council
opined, “In the current state of the means of communication
and given the generalized development of public online
communication services and the importance of the latter for the
participation in democracy and the expression of ideas and
opinions, this right implies freedom to access such services.”8 In
recent history, the United Nations has warned the

4

Elizabeth Dickinson, The First WikiLeaks Revolution?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.
13, 2011, 6:17 PM), http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/wikileaks_and_the_
tunisia_protests.
5
Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD
STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited July 25, 2011). For
comparison, there were just over 360 million Internet users by December 31, 2000. Id.
The FCC reports that, in 2009, eighty percent of home broadband users
accessed the Internet to retrieve local news, fifty-five percent accessed a social
networking site, and forty-eight percent uploaded content. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
BROADBAND PERFORMANCE PAPER: OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 4, at 8 exh. 7 (2010),
available
at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-omnibus-broadband-initiative%28obi%29-technical-paper-broadband-performance.pdf.
6
The BBC took a poll indicating that four in five people worldwide consider
Internet access a “fundamental right.” BBC NEWS, Internet Access Is ‘a Fundamental
Right’ (Mar. 8, 2010, 8:52 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548190.stm. The desire to
make the Internet a fundamental right for all appears even more prominent in
countries with less experience with Internet and less Internet diffusion. WORLD ECON.
FORUM, THE NEW INTERNET WORLD: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, PRIVACY, TRUST AND SECURITY ONLINE 9 (2011), available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GITR_TheNewInternetWorld_Report_2011.pdf.
7
Charles Bremner, Top French Court Rips Heart Out of Sarkozy Internet Law,
TIMES (London) (June 11, 2009), http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/
article6478542.ece.
8
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
decision//2009/decisions-par-date/2009/2009-580-dc/decision-n-2009-580-dc-du-10-juin2009.42666.html (click “Version en anglais” in right sidebar for an English version).
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international community that cutting off Internet access to
quell protest is a human rights violation.9
While some members of the U.S. Supreme Court may be
unwilling to recognize the weight international trends—even
mandates—should have on U.S. lawmaking,10 U.S. citizens must
begin to consider when a central function to daily living becomes
something fundamental or guaranteed. Indeed, Americans
consider the Internet as (if not more) important to their lives as
the rest of the world. In 2009, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) reported that the average American household
user consumed over nine gigabytes of data per month.11 The
number of Americans demanding high-speed Internet access
appears to be accelerating very rapidly as well.12 In the wake of
U.S. economic turmoil, Congress mandated the implementation of
an initiative to make broadband services more accessible to
Americans.13 Perhaps an indicator of increased broadband use,
Facebook (an American-born company) has seen its membership
base grow exponentially.14
Beyond use as a forum for expression and a database for
information, the Internet has become home to increasingly
varied application across the spectrum of telecommunication.
The Internet protocol (IP) suite is now used for phone services

9

David Kravets, U.N. Report Declares Internet Access a Human Right,
WIRED (June 3, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/internet-ahuman-right/.
10
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States choose
to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they spring
into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize
conduct.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s use of international law and trend to reach its decision).
11
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 5, at 4.
12
Edward B. Mulligan, Note, Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network
Management Regulation Back on Track, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 633, 637 (2010) (citing
Table 1121: Adult Computer and Adult Internet Users by Selected Characteristics: 2000
to
2009,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2010/tables/10s1121.pdf).
13
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, div. B, tit. VI,
§ 6001(k)(2), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (“The national broadband plan required
by this section shall seek to ensure that all people of the United States have access to
broadband capability and shall establish benchmarks for meeting that goal.”). For more
information on the National Broadband Plan, see National Broadband Plan:
Connecting America, BROADBAND.GOV, http://www.broadband.gov/plan/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2011).
14
In July 2011, Facebook clocked 750 million registered users, skyrocketing from
500 million users only a year prior. Leena Rao, Zuck Confirms that Facebook Now Has 750
Million Active Users, TECHCRUNCH (July 6, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://techcrunch.com/2011/
07/06/zuck-confirms-that-facebook-now-has-750-million-users/.
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through Voice-Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology,15 IP
television is quickly gaining its footing in the viewership
market,16 and the demand for mobile broadband has greatly
increased with the advent of smartphones, netbooks, tablets,
and other ubiquitous computing devices.17
One need not be terribly tech-savvy to conclude that
much of humanity now relies upon Internet connectivity to
retrieve and deliver content. The question emerges: ought the
United States follow the worldwide trend to afford its citizens a
right to access the lawful Internet content of their choice?
Reserving for others the question of whether such a right
should be fundamental under U.S. law, the most appropriate
placeholder for a right to access Internet content, at least prima
facie, is the First Amendment—the Internet is fundamentally a
form of communication, after all.18 Theorists, scholars, and the
citizenship-at-large must inquire, however, what the contours of
such a recognized right would be, and—more importantly—how
it can be preserved. The foundation of the latter inquiry goes
beyond consumer-centered questions—how the government can
deploy common carriage in the Internet age or how state actors
can ensure that Internet service providers (ISPs) adhere to their
terms of service. It lies in the more fundamental (and essential)
question of how individuals can be assured access to the content
of their choice when their ISPs and government have failed to
account for that interest.
This fundamental question could not be riper for
discussion. Current law and market realities do not easily
accommodate a right or guarantee of access to Internet content.
15

See Voice-Over-Internet Protocol, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/
voip/ (last visited July 25, 2011).
16
Chris Davies, Smart TV Could Overwhelm the Internet Warns Analyst,
SLASHGEAR (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.slashgear.com/smart-tv-coul-overwhelm-theinternet-warns-analyst-30122009/.
17
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 5, at 19. The FCC has recognized the
increasing applications of the Internet, and has chosen to incorporate the abovementioned applications in its rules on Internet openness. Preserving the Open
Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,932-33 (Dec. 21, 2010)
(report and order) [hereinafter Net Neutrality Order].
18
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (concluding that
the limitations on Internet communication for decency under Congress’s
Communications Decency Act was a blanket prohibition that chills free speech). Courts
and some scholars, unsurprisingly, have discussed this theory already. See generally
Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from
Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Free
Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 697 (2010); see also infra note 23.
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Such questions, which strongly seem to implicate constitutional
liberties, are directly affected by network neutrality, an issue
that is transforming Internet accessibility’s legal framework in
the United States.19 Network (net) neutrality is a movement
toward “the non-discriminatory interconnectedness among data
communication networks that allows users to access the
content, and run the services, applications, and devices of their
choice.”20 The movement has emerged in the face of strong
indications that the Internet is becoming (or has become) a
privately regulated infrastructure where ISPs have the power
to impede accessibility to the information exchanged over their
networks.21 Bafflingly, the rise of private control over the
Internet has been met with the fall of FCC oversight, even
though the agency has for decades been tasked with
maintaining nondiscriminatory access to telecommunications.22
19

See, e.g., Robert C. Post, A Progressive Perspective on Freedom of Speech, in
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 179, 185 (Jack N. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (Net
neutrality “will hugely impact the precise ways in which the Internet will contribute to
the formation of public opinion.”); Noam Cohen, Internet Proposal from Google and
Verizon Raises Fears for Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at B3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/media/16link.html; Raze the Mystery House:
America Needs Clearer Laws to Regulate Internet Access, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 2010, at
35, available at http://www.economist.com/node/15867976; Al Franken, The Most
Important Free Speech Issue of Our Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2010, 8:43 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-franken/the-most-important-free-s_b_798984.html.
20
Yemini, supra note 18, at 2 (quoting Sasha D. Meinrath & Victor D.
Pickard, The New Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom, INT’L J. OF
COMMC’NS L. & POL’Y, Winter 2008, at 2, available at http://www.victorpickard.com/
upload/The_New_Network_Neutrality.pdf). Lawrence Lessig captures the concept well
in an interview with Democracy Now!:
Think about the electricity grid. Alright, when you plug a television into the
electricity grid, it doesn’t ask, “Is it a Sony television or a Panasonic
television?” It doesn’t ask, “Is it a toaster made in America or a toaster made
in Japan?” It just runs. It just works. And that’s because the electricity grid is
a neutral network in this sense. You comply with the protocols—what the
plug’s got to look like and how much power you’re taking—and it runs. That’s
the way the internet was. It used to be it didn’t matter whether it was a
browser made by Microsoft or a browser made by Netscape or a browser made
by Mozilla. It just ran because the protocols said if you follow the rules, the
system will run.
Interview by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now!, with Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law,
Stanford Law Sch. (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.democracynow.org/
2008/4/17/law_professor_lawrence_lessig_on_net [hereinafter Lessig Interview].
21
See infra Part I.
22
See infra Part I.A; see also Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151
(2006) (“For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, . . . there is
created a commission to be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’ . . . .”).
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The impending degradations to Internet services imperil the
freedom to access the most widely used forum for public
expression in the world.23
This note tackles the net neutrality problem from a
practical perspective by suggesting and assessing a
countermajoritarian
regulatory
regime
that
checks
administrative and congressional action—a private cause of
action based in constitutional rights. Rather than to solely
outline the constitutional theory that supports net neutrality,
the overarching purpose here is to answer whether, assuming
the regulatory status quo, the federal court system is equipped
to take on the role as arbiter of Internet-content-access disputes.
In making that assessment, this note considers the multiple
layers of constitutional protection that relate to the Internetaccess issue—the freedom of expression and the right to access
for end-users24 as well as the freedoms of expression and
property for ISPs.25 The model of judicial enforcement assessed
here can appropriately weigh individual and intermediary
interests by adjudicating the reasonableness of network
management on a contextual, case-by-case basis. This note
concludes that there is ample existing doctrine to direct these
case-by-case inquiries. But there are obvious hurdles to directly
applying these constitutional standards to end-user litigation—
namely, the state action doctrine and standing. Thus in
conclusion, this note offers specific recommendations for
legislation to facilitate the shift to judicial enforcement as a
mode of Internet regulation that preserves the edges’ rights to
access.26 Part I discusses the contours of the net neutrality
debate and summarizes the nation’s policy regarding Internet
accessibility. Part II describes the shortcomings of other
23

Communication theory coined by Marshall McLuhan states “the medium is
the message.” Mark Federman, What Is the Meaning of the Medium Is the Message?,
UNIV. OF TORONTO (July 23, 2004), http://individual.utoronto.ca/markfederman/article_
mediumisthemessage.htm. That is, a medium’s character is not the content it conveys,
but the effect the medium itself has on society. Id. Here, content’s accessibility by
Internet users is not the legal issue implicated; the issue is the functionality of the
medium in conveying its impact. As related by Jerome Barron, “The new modes of
communication engage us by their form rather than by their content; what captivates
us is the television screen itself.” Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (1967); see also Yemini, supra note 18,
at 15 (“[I]n order to ‘reach’ the logical and content layers, one has to ‘pass through’ the
physical layer; whoever controls the physical layer, unless restricted by law, becomes a
gatekeeper for all other layers . . . .”)
24
See infra Part III.B.1.
25
See infra Part III.B.2.
26
See infra Part IV.
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available enforcement mechanisms, including administrative
rulemaking and legislative action. Part III outlines the legal
standards potentially applicable to constitutional litigation
over a theoretical right to access Internet content and
highlights the benefits of judicial enforcement. Part III also
recognizes the challenges end-user litigants face. Finally, Part
IV proposes a private cause of action for end-user litigants.
I.

THE FALL OF FEDERAL REGULATION, THE EMERGENCE
OF NON-NEUTRALITY

As private control over the Internet’s architecture has
increased, the federal entities that would typically check that
control have taken the back seat. In the current deregulated
environment, the Internet continues to increase in day-to-day
importance. This part outlines the legal and historical
developments that have created this seemingly paradoxical
situation—the shift to broadband infrastructure and the
definitional hocus-pocus that has freed ISPs from common
carriage regulation—then goes on to discuss the main points of
the net neutrality debate. Finally, this part will detail the nonneutral practices that have emerged since the onset of the
FCC’s deregulatory approach to Internet access oversight.
A.

Creating a Non-neutral Network

In the beginning the Internet was open.
From its inception, the Internet has used a packetswitching system,27 which was initially nondiscriminatory.
Packet-switching has proven an extremely efficient mode of
transfer because it allows information, divided into small
pieces called packets, to exchange over any conceivable path of
routers between Internet-connected terminals.28 In its early
stages, the Internet consisted of a network of “narrowband,”
packet-switched networks that were designed such that the
27

DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH
INTERNET AGE 19 (2009). During transfer, information sent from a computer
terminal is separated into pieces that are then reassembled upon receipt. Id. The tags
attached to packets dictate the packets’ destination as well as their source, in addition to
identifying information to reassemble the information at the destination. Id.
28
The packet-switching system’s efficiency is due to the nondiscriminatory
allotment of pathways between routers (to “empower the individual,” interconnecting
router points as a “network of equals”) in contrast to the centralized, “hierarchical”
circuit-switching infrastructure used by the AT&T telephone network. TIM WU, THE
MASTER SWITCH 173 (2011).
IN THE
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long-distance infrastructure carried high-bandwidth traffic to
limited access points. The connection to the end or individual
users, though, was carried by separate, “last-mile” providers,29
which delivered content to central facilities through basic
telephone call technology.30 The old regime was inherently
nondiscriminatory before the advent of broadband. First, on the
physical level, telephone technology and wire use a simple
routing process without any need for intermediary traffic
modification. Second, on the logical level, Internet code uses
the transmission control and Internet protocols (TCP/IP),
which automatically allot service resources to an end-user on a
“first-in first-out” or “best efforts” basis, rather than by the
needs of an interested intermediary.31 These structural
characteristics limited the entities’ ability to modify and block
the traffic running over the last mile.
The incumbent narrowband regime, which (at least
initially) carried Internet providers’ services,32 was also subject
to requirements designed to open competition under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.33 In 1984, the AT&T (Bell)
telephone monopoly34 was ordered to divest its regional
operating companies that provided local service.35 In turn,
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act to combat the
monopoly that “Baby Bells” enjoyed over the local exchanges
and inject competition into those markets.36 Summarized
succinctly, the Act forced the incumbent local exchange carriers
29

Last-mile providers were often the local telephone company. Id. But during
the rise of the Internet, last-mile providers also successfully remained wholly
independent from telephone carriers. See, e.g., id. at 262-63 (describing the AOL’s
“walled garden” business model as wholly independent from the services provided by
telephone-dial-up Internet). The separation between Internet transmission and
services was implemented and maintained through the Nixon and Clinton
administrations. Id. at 309.
30
Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help
or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 23, 31 (2004).
31
Gary S. Becker et al., Net Neutrality and Consumer Welfare, 6 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497, 500-01 (2010); Yoo, supra note 30, at 32-33.
32
H.R. REP. NO. 112-51, at 3 (2011).
33
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
34
The government argued in its 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T that the
company unreasonably restrained trade in the telephone equipment markets in
violation of the Sherman Act, Section Two. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,
139 n.18 (D.D.C. 1982). Judge Greene approved, but modified, the consent decree to
divest the Bell Operating Companies from AT&T long distance, noting that AT&T, for
years, used its market power over local telephone services to prevent the entry of new
competitors in the local exchange and equipment markets. Id. at 223.
35
WU, supra note 28, at 194.
36
Id.
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(ILECs) to interconnect with other companies that wanted to use
the network, resell their services at reasonable rates, unbundle
network elements, and engage in what has become a complex
form of payment between carriers called reciprocal
compensation.37 All these requirements were passed upon findings
that the local, last-mile providers sat on a natural monopoly, or
bottleneck, of information that allowed them to discriminate
against competitors trying to enter the market of data carriage.38
The 1996 Act therefore attempted to limit the extent to which the
last mile could be dominated by a single entity—that is, as long as
the last mile was a telecommunications service subject to the
Communication Act’s Title II39 regulation.
But today, the 1996 Act’s common carrier obligations do
not apply to home broadband Internet services. Whereas
telecommunications services are normally subjected to common
carrier requirements under Title II of the Communications
Act,40 because broadband service providers have been deemed
information services, they are only subject to the lighter touch
of Title I.41 This definitional dichotomy between computing and
telecommunications services was created over the span of
several hearings held to address the burgeoning computer
market and its convergence with telecommunications.42 The
delineation that emerged in those hearings was between
telecommunications and information services and was
maintained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.43
In 2002, the information services designation was
extended from computing to broadband cable modems in the

37

47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (explaining
the natural monopoly in local exchange services); see also Daniel F. Spulber &
Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of
Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV 1822, 1846-47 (2007).
39
47 U.S.C. §§ 251-261.
40
47 U.S.C. § 201(a).
41
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
975-76 (2005).
42
Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, ¶ 8 (1971)).
The earliest dichotomy contemplated was one between basic transmission and
enhanced services, where basic services were regulated, and enhanced services were
not. Id. at 211 (citing Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and
Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, ¶ 2 (1980)).
43
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (44) (defining
information service and telecommunications carrier, respectively)).
38
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FCC’s Cable Broadband Order.44 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the permissibility of that extension in National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass’n (NCTA) v. Brand X Internet
Services.45 In Brand X, the Court indicated that the FCC’s
decision to regulate cable ISPs as information service providers
was an acceptable construction of the Communications Act
because cable companies offer an integrated “offering” of
Internet services and their transmission, rather than a “standalone” transmission service.46 The Court went on to find that
the FCC’s decision to reduce cable Internet access regulation
was justifiable due to the “fast-moving [and] competitive
market” of Internet services.47 In other words, the FCC adopted
the policy of deregulating the burgeoning Internet-services
industry to avoid hindering its progress.48 As articulated by the
FCC, “[E]xisting regulations constrain technological advances
and deter broadband infrastructure investment by creating
disincentives to the deployment of facilities capable of
providing innovative broadband Internet access services.”49
Soon after Brand X was handed down, the FCC issued its
Wireline Broadband Order, which further extended the
information service designation to telephone companies that
provide DSL services.50 In turn, no broadband providers are
currently subject to common carrier regulation under Title II.
But, oddly, the information bottleneck has further spilled into the
realm of hardware as networks have shifted into the broadband
regime.51 This trend is problematic in the rise of broadband, where
44

Id. at 978-79 (discussing Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002)).
45
Id. at 986.
46
Id. at 988.
47
Id. at 977.
48
Id. at 1001 (“The Commission concluded that ‘broadband services should
exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in
a competitive market.’”).
49
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,865 (Sept. 23, 2005) (report and order),
petition denied, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007)
[hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order].
50
Id. at 14,862.
51
Perhaps towards a consumer desire for easy and secure use, the bottleneck
has further pervaded home and mobile information, where providers increasingly
“appliancize” the devices we use to access Internet protocol. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 3 (2008). That is, devices are
purchased—often from the same company that offers access—to perform very specific
functions with IP resources (consider your mobile phone or cable box). In turn, the
ability of intermediaries to constrain end-user behavior is increased. Id. at 8-9. A new
wave of proprietary networks in mobile broadband has created a separate chokepoint,
where today’s popular mobile devices are only capable of accessing what is available on
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intelligent data management hardware is increasingly used
between the last mile and the core,52 and market power in the last
mile of broadband continues to expand.53
Though the United States has enacted no laws since
Brand X that guarantee equal or open access to Internet
content,54 the FCC has nonetheless clearly set a policy goal of
digital connectivity.55 In 2005, the FCC issued a policy
statement in an attempt to effectuate the goal of section 230(b)
of the Communications Act of 1934,56 which states, “It is a
policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation.”57 The policy statement sought “to encourage
broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet” by adopting four
network management principles:
• Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of
their choice . . .
• [T]o run applications and use services of their choice, subject to
the needs of law enforcement . . .

the Apple App Store or Android Market. See Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at
17,925 (noting that a mobile wireless provider prevented users from using online
payment options outside provider’s contracted service). In turn, the constraints upon mobile
hardware are particularly susceptible to the hardware or network provider’s remote access
to IP-enabled devices. See, e.g., Timothy Karr, Is Apple Launching a Pre-Emptive Strike
Against Free Speech?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2011, 8:33 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/timothy-karr/is-apple-launching-a-pree_b_881940.html
(reporting an Apple patent on technology that can shut down the iPhone camera remotely).
52
See, e.g., infra Parts I.C.-D.; see also Yoo, supra note 30, at 32-34 (describing
the emergence of data-sorting technology between end-users to properly provide
cable/Internet services over cable modems, and telephone/Internet services over DSL).
53
S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK: THE FCC IGNORES
AMERICA’S DIGITAL DIVIDE 12 (2005), available at http://www.freepress.net/docs/
broadband_report.pdf.
54
The notable exception is the FCC’s recent Net Neutrality Order. See
generally Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17.
55
See generally Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (Aug. 5, 2005) (policy statement)
[hereinafter Broadband Policy Statement]. The FCC’s policy of promoting competition
over the objection of incumbent technologies goes much further back than the Internet.
See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
Clearly, the FCC has taken a step back from this stance in the last ten years. Net
Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 18,045 (Statement of Commissioner Michael J.
Copps Concurring, FCC 10-201, 2010 WL 5179798, at *7) (“[B]etween 2001 and
2009 . . . the FCC took American consumers on a dangerous deregulatory ride, moving
the transmission component of broadband outside of the statutory framework that
applies to telecommunications carriers.”).
56
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
57
Id. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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• [T]o connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the
network . . .
• [And] to competition among network providers, application and
service providers, and content providers.58

While these principles clearly demonstrate a
commitment to the underlying goals of net neutrality, in reality
they still pose several problems. First, the Broadband Policy
Statement lacks the force of law.59 And second, even if the FCC’s
policy statement did have such authority, it lacks any
cognizable measures to implement the policies set forth.60
Therefore, as the law currently stands, there is little keeping
ISPs from engaging in practices that discriminate against
content to the detriment of end-users.
B.

The Debate

The arguments for and against net neutrality can
mostly be lumped into two fundamental, yet familiar, schools of
thought.61 Proponents think that user competition benefits the
path of innovation in Internet applications, and thus the
government must preserve competition between empowered
end-users in light of the growing market power network
providers can leverage.62 Detractors believe that self-regulation,
and even discrimination by private entities, will not adversely
affect competition at the edges and—importantly—may more
effectively preserve network economics.63 Some critics also
argue that the incentives to engage in business models that
discriminate against content or other Internet applications are
not as readily obvious as proponents suggest.64 Indeed, AT&T
58

Broadband Policy Statement, supra note 55, at 14,988.
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Policy statements
are just that—statements of policy. They are not delegations of regulatory authority.”).
60
Yemini, supra note 18, at 5. Several developments in FCC action have
cropped up since the implementation of the Policy Statement to fill this gap in
regulatory authority. See infra notes 114-15, 131-34 and accompanying text. As
discussed later, there is little to suggest that these rules will survive litigation. See
infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
61
Unsurprisingly, the debate in Congress has remained consistent with party
affiliations. Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A Third Way on Network
Neutrality, 13 NEW ATLANTIS 47, 49 (2006).
62
Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to
Net Neutrality Regulation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 65, 67 (2011); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003).
63
Yoo, supra note 30, at 56-59.
64
In part, the power to switch to other ISPs that do not discriminate against
the content at issue is a viable choice for edge users, and would weigh against an ISP’s
59
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has gone as far as claiming that the net neutrality issue is a
“solution without a problem.”65
Tim Wu, a proponent, characterizes neutrality’s central
premise as “Darwinian”: only the “fittest” applications will
survive the competition between developers.66 The argument
comports with Schumpeterian “creative destruction,” the
frequently invoked theory in technology policy premised on the
notion that competitive innovation tends to build on and destroy
preceding norms chaotically, yet progressively.67 Schumpeterian

decision to engage in that type of practice. Becker et al., supra note 31, at 502. For this
reason, among others, some describe neutrality regulation as “a solution in search of a
problem.” Lyons, supra note 62, at 67. The FCC notes, however, that the ability to
switch providers may not truly remedy the problem, where users may have limited
access to broadband providers, and the cost of switching may be prohibitive. Net
Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,921.
65
Grant Gross, AT&T Says It Didn’t Censor Pearl Jam, PC WORLD (Aug. 9,
2007, 1:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/135767/atandt_says_it_didnt_censor_
pearl_jam.html.
66
Wu, supra note 62, at 145-46; Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No. 02-52
from Tim Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig,
Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 3 (Aug. 22,
2003), available at http://www.timwu.org/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. Google is an appropriate
example. Google began in 1997 as a search engine quickly regarded as having “an
uncanny knack for returning extremely relevant results.” Google History, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/about/corporate/company/history.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2011). Google now offers a wide array of Internet applications—including but not
limited to search functions, word processing, e-mail, social networking, and mapping.
See GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited July 24, 2011). Google has, in turn,
dramatically changed the way end-users access web content. For example, Google was
in large part responsible for the paradigm shift to “cloud computing,” which, as
Google’s current website structure demonstrates, allows users’ applications and data to
be stored remotely, then accessed from any location in the world with no more than a
username and password. See Steve Lohr, Google and I.B.M. Join in ‘Cloud Computing’
Research, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/technology/
08cloud.html. Lawrence Lessig agrees that the value of Google is due in part to the
Internet’s neutrality:
Now, it’s because at no stage did they have to ask permission from the
network owner that they’ve been able to do this. If, at the very beginning,
Larry—Sergey Brin and Larry Page had to go to the existing network owners
at the time, AT&T, for example, and say, “May we develop this new
technology for your network?” it would have taken years for the company,
AT&T, to even figure out whether this was going to be permitted, just like if
they had gone to a cable company and said, “We want to open a new cable
station on your network,” it would take forever to get that permission.
Lessig Interview, supra note 20; see also Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,907
(“The Internet is a level playing field.”).
67
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 38, at 1844 (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1942)); Frank Rose, The Father of Creative
Destruction: Why Joseph Schumpeter Is Suddenly All the Rage in Washington, WIRED
(Mar. 2002), http://wired.com/wired/archive/10.03/schumpeter_pr.html.
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economics appears to suggest that innovation and economic
progress are protected through mandated neutrality.68
According to neutrality activists, ISPs are incentivized to
limit Internet access in order to prevent the utilization of
competitive products or costly content, because they wield
advantages in technology and law.69 These incentives trouble
neutrality proponents in how the consequential practices would
flout the benefits of an “end-to-end”70 design, undermining the
“dumb” or nondiscriminatory Internet structure.71 Today, three
industry practices stand at the forefront of neutrality literature:
transparency, blocking, and tiering.72
Professors Tim Wu and Lawrence Lessig note two
important ways that mandated neutrality benefits the Internet
as a medium. First, treating applications alike makes the
market “predictable,” and therefore, incents the development
of—and investment in—broadband applications.73 Like
electricity, the Internet is a “general purpose technology.”74 Wu
and Lessig note that in the current market for electricity,
electronics manufacturers can design new products with peace
of mind knowing that their products will work; “the uniformity
of the electric grid is a safeguard against the risk of restrictions
and uneven standards” that would give the electric company
the power to discriminate against new products.75 Similarly,

68

Wu, supra note 62, at 145 n.10.
Some congressional representatives have come to this conclusion: “Internet
access service providers have an economic interest to discriminate in favor of their own
services, content, and applications and against other providers.” Internet Freedom
Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 2(10) (2009). For example, several
ISPs have engaged in full-scale blocking of VoIP technology, which allows users to
make phone calls over the Internet. NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 9-10.
70
The “end-to-end” argument was drafted by Jerome Saltzer, David Reed,
and David Clark, and “counsels against introducing intelligence into the core of the
Internet.” Yoo, supra note 30, at 41. Under the theory, the better system is one that
checks for errors only at the origin and destination of packet transmission—end-to-end.
Id. See generally J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984), available at http://web.mit.edu/
Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf.
71
See Yemini, supra note 18, at 1 (explaining that through “technological,
economic, and legal factors,” ISPs can now control the stream of data transmission and
that data transmission was formerly controlled by the end-users themselves).
72
Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 61, at 49-50.
73
Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 3. The FCC noted that “[n]ovel, improved, or
lower-cost offerings introduced by content, application, service, and device providers spur
end-user demand and encourage broadband providers to expand their networks and
invest in new broadband technologies.” Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,911.
74
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,909.
75
Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 3. Congress seems to agree with this
analogy. See H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 2(2) (2009) (“The Internet is an essential
69
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investment in new Internet applications and infrastructure
developments will be stabler if the resource is open and ISPs
cannot block “undesirable” applications.
Second, neutrality promotes the policy of innovation
among applications.76 There is some speculation, given the
current climate of law and technology, that ISPs will shift
toward a tiered business model—one that charges fees when
there is too much congestion on the network or that charges
content providers for edge-user access to their sites.77 Such
tiered access to content could prevent innovators from creating
new uses for the Internet. For instance, if a search engine’s
accessibility were treated more favorably than other sites on a
network, developers would be incentivized to continue
providing new Internet search features, without necessarily
developing new media-streaming applications.78 The range of
possible Internet applications would therefore be limited, and
the benefits to end-user access decreased.79
In response, those opposed to net neutrality regulations
argue that “prophylactic” regulations could limit an ISP’s
incentive and resources to invest in new infrastructure.80
Though the neutrality agenda would further a right to access
Internet content, vying for complete neutrality ignores the fact
that there are inherent trade-offs between mutually exclusive
network design characteristics. That is, if internetworks
prioritize connectivity, network providers may sacrifice the
quality of service (QoS) applications necessary to access highbandwidth content without latency.81 Some have therefore
infrastructure that is comparable to roads and electricity in its support for a diverse
array of economic, social, and political activity.”).
76
Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 5.
77
Becker et al., supra note 31, at 501.
78
The World Wide Web, for example, was created almost twenty years after the
development of Internet protocols. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,910. If the
Internet’s initial development was stifled by network providers’ intermediation, the
existence of the World Wide Web may not have become a reality. Furthermore, “[r]estricting
[the] edge providers’ ability to reach end users, and limiting end users’ ability to choose
which edge providers to patronize, would reduce the rate of innovation at the edge and, in
turn, the likely rate of improvements to network infrastructure.” Id. at 17,911.
79
Professors Wu and Lessig note a similar example in online gaming. In
short, under the current system ISPs are inclined to prohibit or disincentivize the use
of popular online gaming applications because of the large amount of bandwidth they
occupy. “If carriers choose to block online games in particular, this gives a market
advantage to competing applications that have not been blocked.” Wu & Lessig, supra
note 66, at 15.
80
Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 61, at 49. But see ZITTRAIN, supra note 51,
at 105 (noting that maintaining the “generative Internet” has historically allowed for
technology to overcome “blunderbuss technology regulation”).
81
Wu, supra note 62, at 148-49.
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argued that forms of data discrimination are a viable remedy
toward efficiency.82 There is certainly very little debate over
whether network providers ought to engage in discriminatory
practices when it comes to detecting harmful information
packets, such as viruses.83 The contentious question is what
constitutes “reasonable network management” within the
context of the current deregulated market, and how far an ISP
may go in invading and prioritizing the content an end-user is
uploading or downloading.84
C.

Comcast v. FCC

The landscape of Internet access law reached the apex
of deregulation in 2010’s Comcast v. FCC85 decision from the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The facts of Comcast show—
unequivocally—that when left to its own devices, the corporate
intermediary has the ability and the incentive to impede enduser access. The holding, on the other hand, may be the final
straw in stripping the FCC of its power to regulate network
management and, in turn, content access.
In 2007, the Associated Press released a report
confirming through “nationwide tests” that Comcast was
engaging in data discrimination.86 By impeding traffic, Comcast
kept peer-to-peer applications from “swallowing” bandwidth
and thereby limiting the Internet experience of other
subscribers.87 Comcast admitted to prioritizing service for this
reason, but only after investigation.88
82

See generally Yoo, supra note 18.
See Wu, supra note 62, at 150-51; see also Internet Freedom Preservation
Act, S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007) (Congress proposing to mandate neutrality except
when “protecting the security of a user’s computer on the network”).
84
The FCC’s new rules on network neutrality purport to carve out the
parameters of what reasonable network management is. See Net Neutrality Order,
supra note 17, at 17,951-56. Free Press, Public Knowledge, and many other advocacy
groups took issue with the broad definitions provided in the rules, particularly
“reasonable network management.” Letter from Sean McLaughlin, Exec. Dir., Access
Humboldt, et al. to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, et al. 3 (Dec. 10, 2010),
available at http://www.freepress.net/files/FCC_Letter_Real_Net_Neutrality.pdf.
85
600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
86
Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. POST (Oct. 19,
2007, 6:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/
AR2007101900842.html.
87
Id.; Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644. One peer-to-peer application affected was
BitTorrent. Id. BitTorrent, as explained by the FCC, puts strain on the network
because of its untraditional method of sharing information. See Formal Complaint of
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028,
13,029 (Aug. 1, 2008) (decision and order), vacated, Comcast, 600 F.3d 642 [hereinafter
Comcast Order]. Rather than directly connecting a user’s computer directly to a shared
83
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By order of the FCC, Comcast reported the following
network management practices: Comcast’s subscribers had
been grouped together and routed to hubs through a Cable
Modem Termination System (CMTS).89 There had been
approximately 3300 CMTS hubs functioning in the Comcast
network, and they had served several million subscribers.90
Subscribers’ cable modems had shared upstream ports (content
received from users’ cable modems) and downstream ports
(content sent to users’ cable modems) on the hubs.91 In order to
reduce congestion, Comcast installed hardware that analyzed
the upstream traffic and managed information packets with
characteristics that put undue strain on the network, in effect
terminating the delivery of those packets.92 Comcast was
careful to note that actual packet content was not inspected.93
The FCC did not take sole issue with Comcast’s network
management itself, however—what was more disconcerting
was the fact that traffic-blocking targeted specific online
conduct and “a customer ha[d] no way of knowing when
Comcast . . . [had] terminate[d] a connection.”94
After investigation, the FCC decided that Comcast was
not engaging in “reasonable network practices,” and thus
concluded that Comcast had violated the agency’s Broadband
Policy Statement95 by “imped[ing] Internet users’ ability to use
applications and access content of their choice.”96 The FCC
ordered Comcast to file a disclosure statement with the
Commission detailing its invasive network management
practices97 and to suspend the unreasonable practices at issue.98
The FCC claimed jurisdiction to rule on Comcast’s conduct
through multiple sections of the Communications Act by direct
server, BitTorrent uses a “decentralized distribution model” where pieces of a single
file can be downloaded from other users simultaneously. Id. Therefore, extra strain is
put on network bandwidth because the user engages in several Internet connections at
once, as opposed to connecting to a “single, central pipeline.” Id. at 13,029-30.
88
Comcast Corp. Description of Current Network Mgmt. Practices at 1,
Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 FCC
Rcd. 13,028 (No. 08-183) (2008) [hereinafter Comcast Description].
89
Id. at 1.
90
Id. at 2.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Only the “addressing, protocol, and other ‘header’ information that tells the
network equipment what kind of packet it is” was inspected. Id. at 7.
94
Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,051.
95
Supra note 55.
96
Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,058.
97
Id. at 13,060.
98
Id.
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and ancillary authority.99 Invoking Brand X,100 the Commission
based its authority to regulate “facilities-based ISPs under its
Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”101
Comcast challenged the order in the D.C. Circuit, where
the Court of Appeals held that the FCC failed to argue with
specificity its statutory basis to regulate broadband data
management practices.102 The FCC attempted to rely on its
ancillary authority under Title I of the Act,103 as suggested
regarding DSL service in Brand X,104 but the D.C. Circuit
opined that the FCC would be stretching the Supreme Court’s
precedent too far in arguing that this was a grant of “plenary
authority over such providers . . . .”105 The court also rejected
any argument that the FCC could draw ancillary authority
from policy statements such as Section 151 of the
Communications Act, which states the purpose of the FCC: to
regulate “interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire so as to make available . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide wire and radio communication service.”106 The
court determined that legislative statements of policy—though
conceivably declarations of the “legislative will”107—“alone
cannot provide the basis for the Commission’s exercise of
ancillary authority”;108 the FCC needed a congressionally
delegated power to which the administrative agency’s action
could be “tethered.”109 The court went on methodically to decide
that each section of the Act the FCC cited (including common

99

The Commission relied on section 230(b) of the Communications Act as
well as six other sections of the Act to justify exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 13,036.
100
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
101
Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,035 (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996).
102
Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Despite the D.C.
Circuit’s conclusion, this was not the first time the FCC had exercised authority in
preventing a carrier from blocking Internet applications and content. In 2005, the FCC
adopted a consent decree requiring a fine of Madison River Communications, which
was blocking ports used for VoIP traffic. Madison River Commc’n, LLC & Affiliated
Cos., 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 (Mar. 3, 2005) (consent decree).
103
47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006) (“The Commission may perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in
execution of its functions.”).
104
The Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that the Commission may
“reconsider[] its treatment of DSL service . . . when it decides whether, pursuant to its
ancillary Title I jurisdiction, to require cable companies to allow independent ISPs
access to their facilities.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002.
105
Comcast, 600 F.3d at 650-51.
106
Id. at 651-52 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151).
107
Id. at 652.
108
Id. at 654.
109
Id.
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carriage requirements110 and the mandate to implement
broadband111) delegates no specific authority over the practice at
issue.112 Thus, in one rap of the gavel, the D.C. Circuit created
far-reaching consequences for the debate on net neutrality.
More importantly, the decision has called into question the
extent of a right to access Internet content—a guarantee that
Internet users should expect to retain.
D.

Post-Comcast Developments

To combat the trend of deregulation, the FCC has
recently proposed and adopted rules for broadband
management based on the Broadband Policy Statement,113
which explains the enforcement mechanisms that will attempt
to aid in antidiscrimination measures.114 In the recent order, the
FCC established three broad rules toward preserving an open
Internet: transparency in broadband management, a
prohibition against blocking “lawful content, applications,
services, [and] non-harmful devices,” and a prohibition against
“unreasonable discrimination.”115
While an important step in FCC regulation of Internet
practices, the rules stand on unstable legal foundation after
Comcast. The FCC faced challenges immediately after it
released its Net Neutrality Order. Verizon has brought an
appeal to challenge the FCC’s authority to enforce the rules.116
The House of Representatives has also challenged the rules,
moving to overturn the Net Neutrality Order through its
powers under the Congressional Review Act.117 Contending that
“the retail availability of Internet access service [has] never
[been] regulated,”118 and noting the “sweeping” and “stifling”
effect the rules would have,119 the House Committee on Energy

110

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
47 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011).
112
Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658-61 (discussing 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, 257, 301-99b,
543, 1302(a)).
113
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
114
See generally Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17.
115
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,906.
116
Terrence O’Brien, Verizon Appeals Net Neutrality Rules, Let the Legal
Wrangling Begin, ENGADGET (Sept. 30, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://www.engadget.com/
2011/09/30/verizon-appeals-net-neutrality-rules-let-the-legal-wrangling-be/.
117
Id.
118
H.R. REP. NO. 112-51, at 4 (2011).
119
Id. at 6.
111
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and Commerce voted to disapprove the Order.120 The House
voted in favor of the committee’s resolution.121
Textually speaking, Congress’s resolution appears to
harp on a meritorious argument. Comcast’s holding is much
broader than a statement that the FCC lacks authority because
there is no specific rule on network management: the court’s
language explicitly states that the FCC has not shown tethering
for a statutory authority to regulate the activity of broadband
network management.122 As noted by Commissioner McDowell,
the lesson from Comcast was that Congress “has not established
a new title of the Act to police Internet network management,
not even implicitly.”123 Nonetheless, the FCC stated in its Net
Neutrality Order that it has ancillary authority to pass the rules
under several sections of the Act, including section 706.124 But
the D.C. Circuit ruled unequivocally that section 706125 does “not
delegate any regulatory authority” for broadband network
management.126 Therefore, without congressional action, the FCC
cannot properly impose regulatory obligations with respect to
network management on ISPs. This shift in regulatory authority
suggests that it is due time to impart greater weight on the
discussion at hand.
***

Today, the Internet is non-neutral, privately regulated,
and free from oversight protecting individual freedom. For now,
Internet users are stuck in the bottleneck. Some suggest that
the incentive to block or tier Internet access is not economically
viable for the Internet gatekeeper.127 But if private ordering
were a sustainable solution, the incidence of traffic-shaping,
120

Id. at 13.
Tony Romm, House Votes to Repeal Net Neutrality Order, POLITICO (Apr.
8, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/52826.html.
122
Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“‘[T]he allowance of
wide latitude in the exercise of delegated powers is not the equivalent of untrammeled
freedom to regulate activities over which the statute fails to confer . . . Commission
authority.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 618
(D.C. Cir. 1976))).
123
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 18,053 (dissenting statement of
Comm’r M. McDowell).
124
The FCC cited Sections 201, 230, 254, 628, 706, and Title III of the Act. Net
Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,966-81.
125
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011) (“The
Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . .”).
126
Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659.
127
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
121
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blocking, and tiering should not have increased after Comcast.
In fact, users continue to feel packet restrictions over home and
wireless networks.128 In 2010, Level 3—the primary backbone
provider for Netflix—engaged in heated negotiations with
Comcast because Comcast began tolling Level 3’s traffic
transmitted over the network.129 Even more recently, several
ISPs have proposed and implemented tiered or capped access to
the Internet in the mobile space.130 While there are economic
arguments to support the beneficial aspects of private
broadband, the public must begin to speculate as to its options
should private intermediaries constrain the bottleneck to a
point of no return.
II.

THE PITFALLS OF OTHER MODES OF PROTECTION

Post-Comcast, regulators must look forward to fashion a
regime that will better account for a right to access Internet
content. Although the FCC may be disempowered to adjudicate
the issues presented by non-neutral telecommunications under
its current Title II authority, other federal powers with the
ability to enforce individual liberties still exist. Considered a
priori, a new approach to FCC oversight, antitrust litigation, or
congressional legislation could each provide a meaningful
method to regulate ISPs and account for end-users’ theoretical
right to access. This section concludes, however, that these
modes of protection face problems similar to, and even broader
than, the now defunct FCC framework.
A.

Administrative Law

This section proposes methods by which federal
administrative agencies may step into the fray of Internet
access regulation. First, this section will outline and criticize
128

See Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,925-27.
Comcast v. Level 3: Online Netflix Traffic Causes Fee Fight, USA TODAY
(Nov. 30, 2010, 10:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-12-01-comcast01_
ST_N.htm.
130
AT&T has implemented a data-capping regime that charges a fee for every
fifty GB of content over the 150 GB limit for mobile web users. Amy Lee, AT&T to
Impose Broadband Data Cap, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2011, 11:21 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/14/att-data-cap_n_835318.html. Verizon also
made the move to tiered data pricing in July 2011. Roger Cheng, Verizon’s New Pricing
Plan is a Godsend for Sprint, CNET (July 6, 2011, 10:26 AM), http://news.cnet.com/
8301-1035_3-20077218-94/verizons-new-pricing-plan-is-a-godsend-for-sprint/?tag=rtcol;pop.
If the AT&T/T-Mobile merger takes effect, Sprint will be the only mobile wireless
carrier with market power that does not restrict bandwidth usage. Id.
129

404

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

the FCC’s Third Way—a proposal designed to reconceptualize
the categorical approach to telecommunications policy. Second,
this section will present similar and broader problems
presented by antitrust litigation as a mode of protection.
1. The FCC’s Third Way
Comcast and its background decisions have greatly
weakened an enforceable regulatory scheme that protects
Internet content access through the FCC’s administrative power.
In a frenzy to fill the regulatory gap created, Chairman
Genachowski has proposed building a legal foundation for the
regulation of Internet access by bifurcating the classification
between Internet access and Internet content itself, allowing the
FCC to regulate access to the Internet as a “telecommunications
service” under Title II common carriage requirements131 and to
regulate the information layer under Title I.132 This strategy is
aptly nicknamed the “Third Way”—a third method of regulation
beyond staying the course or reclassifying broadband Internet to
Title II regulation altogether.133 The FCC bases its legal
foundation for this reclassification on the dissent in Brand X,
where Justice Scalia argued that transmission of broadband and
computing were two separate “offerings” within the meaning of
the Communications Act.134
But as long as rules are based solely on the power of the
FCC to regulate toward an efficient communications network,135
there is ample room for regulation to run astray from
individual interests in accessing the Internet’s content. For
example, the historical trend is that the FCC pushes the
boundaries of regulating indecent speech over broadcast.136
Without tying FCC action to principles of individual freedom,
Chairman Genachowski’s proposal and the attempted passage
of the Net Neutrality Order stop short of guaranteeing access to
131

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Austin Schlick, General Counsel, FCC, A Third-Way Legal Framework for
Addressing the Comcast Dilemma, NAT’L BROADBAND PLAN (May 6, 2010),
http://www.broadband.gov/third-way-legal-framework-for-addressing-the-comcastdilemma.html.
133
Id.
134
Id.; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 1008 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he telecommunications component of cablemodem service retains such ample independent identity that it must be regarded as
being on offer . . . .”).
135
See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). The purposes of the FCC dictated in the Act
make no mention of preserving access for individual expression.
136
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1806-10 (2009).
132

2011] PROTECTING A RIGHT TO ACCESS INTERNET CONTENT

405

Internet content.137 That is, even if the FCC could regulate
discriminatory practices limiting such access now, there is no
guarantee that the FCC would do so in the future.
Despite the passage of the Net Neutrality Order, the
FCC’s regulatory capture and politicization present stark
obstacles in appointing the FCC as the sole arbiter of endusers’ individual rights going forward.138 In May 2011, after
approving Comcast’s massive acquisition of NBC Universal
(NBCU), Commissioner Baker took a position with Comcast as
senior vice president of government affairs.139 This development
is problematic because the Comcast-NBCU merger goes against
obvious policy considerations in promoting competition and
common notions of First Amendment theory.140 As noted by
Judge Greene in precluding AT&T from entering the market of
electronic publishing post-divestiture:
If, under these circumstances, AT&T were permitted to engage
both in the transmission and the generation of information,
there would be a substantial risk not only that it would stifle the
efforts of other electronic publishers but that it would acquire a
substantial monopoly over the generation of news in the more
general sense. Such a development would strike at a principle
which lies at the heart of the First Amendment: that the
American people are entitled to a diversity of sources of
information.141

2. Antitrust Enforcement
The possibility of antitrust enforcement presents pitfalls
equally deleterious to the end-user’s right to access. In
February 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) hired as
137

“There is a very strong presumption in most legal systems that other
things being equal an interpretation which makes a law conform to a principle is to be
preferred to one which does not.” Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,
81 YALE L.J. 823, 839 (1972).
138
Of interest, Rob Frieden explains that the FCC’s attempts to gain greater
flexibility in interpreting its statutory authority could be motivated by the following:
“[T]he FCC engages in decision making with a preordained outcome designed to accrue
political dividends and support economic doctrine regardless of the facts and regardless
of whether the decision unfairly and unlawfully tilts the competitive playing field in
favor of one group of stakeholders over others.” Rob Frieden, Neither Fish Nor Fowl:
New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 373, 415-16 (2008).
139
Joelle Tessler, Meredith Attwell Baker, FCC Commissioner, Joins
NBCUniversal 4 Months After Approving Comcast Merger, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11,
2011, 9:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/11/meredith-attwell-bakercomcast-nbcuniversal_n_860889.html.
140
See infra Part III.B.1.b.
141
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 223-24 (D.D.C. 1982).
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a senior advisor Tim Wu, a neutrality advocate and scholar in
telecommunications policy.142 Beyond demonstrating the FTC’s
intention to regulate the telecommunications industry, Wu’s
appointment signals the FTC’s desire to gain consultation in
regulating telecommunications economics. The FTC, along with
the FCC and Department of Justice (DOJ), is vested with the
power to require certain provisions in agreements between
merging telecommunications companies.143 The FTC’s goal, of
course, is to prevent unfair competition and deceptive acts in
the marketplace.144
The FTC’s role in regulating competition could
potentially account for end-user interests through mandating
competitive interconnection, and neutrality principles in the
course of corporate mergers. But the degree to which
interconnection requirements preclude other antitrust suits145
may be unclear after the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.146
Furthermore, though the FTC may be qualified to monitor and
enforce complex antitrust violations that may emerge in nonneutral conduct,147 the FTC—like the FCC—is no less
susceptible to partisan and sometimes shortsighted goals. Just
as the FCC has no obligation to preserve the free-expression
interests of consumers, the FTC and DOJ may likewise
maintain minimal oversight when the American economy
benefits from a potential merger despite other harmful effects
that merger may entail.148
Furthermore, mandating neutrality provisions in
merger agreements poses the possibility of piecemeal
regulation.149 That is, under the FTC’s review, an ISP may
voluntarily take on neutrality principles with respect to some
142

Spencer E. Ante & Thomas Catan, Columbia Law’s Tim Wu to Advise FTC,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274
8703313304576132310943386724.html.
143
See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (2006) (vesting power of enforcement in FCC and FTC);
16 C.F.R. § 2.31-34 (2010) (outlining process for consent agreement among filing party).
144
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
145
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 38, at 1874.
146
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
147
Cf. id. at 415 (expressing disfavor in granting a general court’s authority to
engage in regulatory practices more typical to an administrative agency).
148
But see generally Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files
Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile (Aug. 31, 2011), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-at-1118.html.
149
Consider, for instance, the problems that have emerged from siloed
treatment of information services as opposed to telecommunication services, where
both in fact provide identical offerings. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
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forms of transmission, but not others. In the Comcast-NBCU
merger, for instance, Comcast agreed to abide by the FCC’s Net
Neutrality Order, even if the order was overturned by a federal
court.150 The agreement did not, however, prohibit Comcast
from blocking Google TV, an emerging television service that
provides video programming over Internet protocol, but on a
digital television set.151 A lack of uniformity with respect to
neutrality principles undermines Internet connectivity where
the bottleneck problem is particularly constraining—regions of
the country that have no choice in deciding which broadband
provider to use.152 In those regions, the market cannot remedy
an ISP’s lack of net neutrality through competing providers’
ability to offer greater packaged access.
B.

Congressional Action

Congressional legislation could potentially fill the gap in
broadband regulation to preserve user freedom, but Congress
must be careful to avoid crafting the systemic problems that
created the non-neutral network in the first place. Congress
has attempted on several occasions to fashion bills that, in one
way or another, proscribe acts of data discrimination and
business models that discriminate against end-users. In 2007,
the U.S. Senate introduced the Internet Freedom Preservation
Act to amend the Communications Act.153 The bill proposed a
new section, “Internet Neutrality,” to be appended to Title I of
the Communications Act.154 The new section would address
largely the same concerns presented in the FCC’s Broadband
Policy Statement, but it would more explicitly proscribe the acts
of blocking, discriminating against, or degrading broadband
service for accessing lawful content.155 In addition, the bill
requires ISPs to transmit content in a non-discriminatory
manner that never “impose[s] a charge on the basis of the type
of content.”156
150

Sam Gustin, A Media Colossus Is Born: Feds Approve Comcast-NBCU
Merger, WIRED (Jan. 18, 2011, 3:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/01/
comcast-nbcu/.
151
Id.
152
See Yemini, supra note 18, at 14 (“More than one quarter of consumers
have only one choice between cable and DSL, and even in markets with both services
available, customers usually face a duopoly . . . .”); see also supra note 64.
153
S. 215, 110th Cong. (2007).
154
Id. § 2.
155
Id.
156
Id.
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The House of Representatives presented a similar bill in
2009 that proposed to amend the Communications Act to include
a section called “Internet Freedom.”157 In addition to protections
similar to those listed in the FCC’s Broadband Policy Statement,
the bill proposed to prohibit both charging a fee to access lawful
content and providing or selling devices that prioritize traffic for
content or application providers; more broadly, the bill mandated
“offer[ing] Internet access service to any person upon reasonable
request therefor.”158 Significantly, the bill attempted to give the
FCC power to make rules protecting against data discrimination
and other anticompetitive practices.159 Legislatively empowering
the FCC to make such rules would greatly help to fill the
jurisdictional gap between the FCC’s Broadband Policy Statement
and rules for network management.
But congressional legislation has two inherent
limitations. First, with respect to rulemaking authority,
mandating broad and unchecked regulatory power to the FCC
has historically created the very threat that necessitates this
writing.160 Second, legislation may codify overly specific legal
regimes that cannot properly adapt to the dynamic technology
that emerges in telecommunications. The Telecommunications
Act, for instance, was created with the intention of opening the
market for competition in telephony, but Congress could not
adequately consider the emergence of Internet over broadband
at the time of the Act’s passage. In turn, legislation left the
medium untouched by the obsolete, siloed common-carriage
requirements of federal law,161 and the populace continues to
wait for a legislative solution.
***

Public sentiment and popular expectations do not
control the federal regulatory powers-that-be; in fact, societal
and governmental interests are sometimes in direct conflict.
The FCC and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC), specifically, have been allowed leeway to infringe on
normative expectations typically subject to constitutional
protection.162 Therefore, if the only avenue to uphold citizens’
157

H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
Id.
159
Id.
160
See supra Part II.A.1.
161
See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
(“[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
158

2011] PROTECTING A RIGHT TO ACCESS INTERNET CONTENT

409

interests rests in courts of appeals’ review of these infringing
decisions, the Chevron standard163 categorically tips the scale
towards affirming administrative regulatory decisions.
Considering the rise of the non-neutral network, that
framework is perilous to the establishment of a right to access
Internet content. If, on the other hand, there is a competing
forum for public outcry against regulatory action and
communication-industry practices, ISPs and the government
may be pressured to comport with individuals’ interests.
Supplementing the FCC’s regulatory power with claims of
individual right—in turn elevating the discourse on network
management and pricing—thus avoids two pitfalls inherent in
the other forms of regulation: first, users can be sure that they
will have a claim available to them despite partisan effects on
regulatory bodies; and, more importantly, the free flow of ideas
can be secured in the Internet medium with a malleable
standard despite the current lack of regulatory power under
the Communications Act.
III.

THE VENUE OF LAST RESORT: FEDERAL COURTS

In the absence of other oversight, federal courts can
appropriately enforce a right to access Internet content; they
have original jurisdiction over constitutional disputes164 and the
ability to establish uniform rules.165 Though there are
downsides to judicial oversight, the benefits are well-suited for
the topic at hand. The underlying question, however, is what
doctrinal “equipment” the courts can use to adjudicate these
Amendment standards applied to them.”); KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 671
(D.C. Cir. 1931) (upholding FRC’s decision to deny a radio license where doctor’s
program was “not in the public interest”); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the
National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 94 (1995) (“The First
Amendment permits forcing some information conduits to accept content generated by
others, but only when such forcing is necessary to permit the content to find its
audience.”). But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820-21 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the historically “dubious” and “incoherent” interpretation
of the First Amendment with respect to broadcast); see also Net Neutrality Order, supra
note 17, at 17,984 (FCC considering consumer First Amendment interests in issuing
order); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting FCC’s
repeal of fairness doctrine for effect on First Amendment speech).
163
“[A]mbiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are
delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. . . . If a
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron
requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute.” Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 & n.11 (1984)).
164
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
165
See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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disputes. This part will detail the constitutional doctrine
applicable to an end-user’s challenge and address its current
hurdles absent the existence of a private right of action—state
action and standing. Incidentally, this part explores the contours
of a theoretical right to access Internet content. To be clear, the
goal of this section is not to argue that a non-neutral network
violates the Constitution. Rather, in recognizing at the forefront
that there is no express constitutional basis for litigation
(though that point is arguable166), the goal here is to highlight the
normative constitutional values that could inform a judicial
avenue of redress to protect the end-user’s right to access
Internet content. The considerations posed here will provide a
basis for a legislatively created cause-of-action for end-users.
A.

The Benefits and Drawbacks of Judicial Enforcement

Addressing Internet rights through the court system is
appealing for two reasons. First, case-by-case adjudication will
maintain the order of individual rights while considering the
interests of ISPs. Contextual, fact-specific consideration will
also account for new technologies that may modify individual
and corporate interests without creating legacy limitations that
entrench themselves in federal legislation or administrative
rulemaking.167 Second, a broad power to adjudicate disputes
between end-users and ISPs will avoid the constitutional
problems that arise from overly specific congressional
mandates168 and fill the regulatory gap left in administrative
law.169 Furthermore, while net neutrality is an issue of
technological infrastructure, the debate’s implications on
personal liberty are so great that creating an additional,
countermajoritarian remedial avenue based in constitutional
doctrine may increase pressure on ISPs to properly consider
individual freedom through their own self-regulation.170
As noted by the FCC, case-by-case adjudication is
preferred when considering data management regulation and

166

See infra Part III.C.
See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
168
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing First and Fifth Amendment protections of ISPs).
169
See supra Part II.A.
170
It is worth noting that the FCC certainly has free expression in mind by
imposing its net neutrality rules. See Net Neutrality Order, supra at 17, at 17,906. The
concern posed here is whether that standard can be maintained by FCC oversight. The
history of Internet regulation suggests that it cannot, and thus, regulators are left to
consider whether self-regulation may provide the proper oversight. But see supra Part I.D.
167
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common carrier–type problems.171 Indeed, the complexity of the
medium begs that regulators weigh interests in every dispute
arising over its access.172 The language of the Communications
Act also suggests a fact-based inquiry when assessing the
regulation of the telecommunications industry.173 Some may
argue that the FCC’s Title I case-by-case adjudicative authority
is better suited for the specialized knowledge of FCC
commissioners. But in applying conservative and static
constitutional jurisprudence,174 courts are equipped to ascertain
whether data management practices are overly broad or
burdensome on an individual’s right to access information
through fact-based inquiries.175 Further, establishing a separate
avenue of adjudicative remedy in the courts will put action
directly into the hands of citizens.
Federal adjudication through constitutional discourse
provides two further benefits. First, judicial interpretation of the
Constitution can maintain uniform, binding precedent through
the Supremacy Clause.176 Uniformity would therefore extend and
preserve end-user rights to their maximum potential. Second,
grounding ISP practices in limits delineated by the Constitution
creates precedent that supersedes the actions of administrative
agencies, and, further, signals congressional action.177 Decisions
171

Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,046.
See id.
See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2006) (allowing for
common carrier requirements when such action is “desirable in the public interest,”
and as long as they are “just and reasonable”); see also Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United
States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (weighing the public and private detriment
caused by federal regulation of a telephone invention).
174
For instance, the First Amendment precedent stating that strict scrutiny is
triggered when the government restricts expression “because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content” traces its origins to the 1960s. Police Dep’t of City of
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269,
270 (1964)). While the contours of this doctrine have changed over time, the origins
remain in effect. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
175
Stated simply, a court need not know much about engineering or network
design to determine whether there are other means to achieve an ISP’s “compelling
purpose,” or whether there is any reasonable purpose at all. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
Those means can be proposed by the litigants themselves.
176
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
177
For instance, in 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in United States v.
Lopez, that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power in legislating a federal
offense for “knowingly . . . possess[ing] a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” 514 U.S. 549, 551, 561-63 (1995).
The federal statute was later amended to include the “jurisdictional element” necessary
172
173
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would therefore serve as a second line of defense should
deregulation befall administrative action in the future.
Despite these systemic benefits, Lawrence Lessig argues
that “[U.S. citizens] don’t want courts choosing among
contested matters of values,”178 values that are clearly
implicated in the Internet-access issues presented here. Courts
are ill-fitted to determine these values, argues Lessig, because
translating Internet issues into matters of constitutional law
will inevitably result in “political” decision making that
“makes,” rather than “finds,” cyberspace’s expressive
characteristics.179 Put more concretely, when factual inquiries
are left to judicial discretion, the possibility of directing
cyberspace’s architectural realities increases. These decisions
are perilous to Internet architecture, concludes Lessig, because
they will dictate what cyberspace will become, perhaps in a
manner contrary to end-user desires.180 For reasons discussed
briefly below, Congress can circumscribe the courts’ valueoriented judgments through legislative specificity.
B.

The Rights at Stake: The Contours of Constitutional
Litigation

With the benefits of judicial oversight in mind, this
section proposes some of the normative legal values that are
relevant to end-user litigation. As discussed below, there is an
initial hurdle to constitutional discourse because ISPs do not
(at least ostensibly) seem to fit within the traditional state
action doctrine.181 This section therefore, in part, applies
constitutional precedent to ISPs by analogy, as if they were
state actors. The end goal here is to provide and assess the
relevant legal theory that may underpin a court’s decision in a
hypothetical end-user challenge.

to “ensure . . . that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.”
United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2005).
178
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 8 (2006).
179
Id. at 316-17. “We have tools from real space that will help resolve the
interpretive questions by pointing us in one direction or another, at least some of the
time. But in the end the tools will guide us even less than they do in real space and
time.” Id. at 25.
180
Id. at 317.
181
See infra Part III.C.1.
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1. Edge Users’ Rights
a. Traditional First Amendment Protection
There is no question that the Internet is a form of
communication.182 The Supreme Court has confirmed that
Internet content, if protected, can receive unqualified First
Amendment scrutiny.183 Furthermore, Congress has found, as
one of the bases of proposed legislation, that free speech is
protected by “preserving the open nature of Internet
communications.”184
Impeding content due to agreement or disagreement
with its message is a viewpoint-based regulation deserving
heightened scrutiny under traditional First Amendment
Though
the
Internet
has
unique
jurisprudence.185
characteristics from other media, it does not have
characteristics that set it so apart from the realm of speech
that content- or viewpoint-based regulation would yield lesser
scrutiny under First Amendment analysis.186 This is the case
despite the fact that Internet “speech” can be omnidirectional—
that is, without a specified geographical or personal recipient—
and does not seem to fit neatly into the traditional, bimodal
framework of speaker and government conceived by the
Constitution.187 Therefore, as under traditional First Amendment
protection, if restraining or degrading edge-user access to the
core infrastructure were a form of content-specific regulation,188
the First Amendment would provide protection under

182

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (The Internet is “a unique and
wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230
(2006) (“The Internet . . . offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.”).
183
See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
184
Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 2(14)
(2009).
185
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
186
Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (noting that the Internet has not historically been
regulated by the government and is not as invasive as radio or television, and still
triggers unqualified First Amendment scrutiny).
187
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 576-77 (2002) (ruling that the
question of “contemporary community standards” in the discussion of obscenity can
still be applied in the context of Internet speech, even though there is no targeted
geographic community in posting on a website). That is not to say, however, that the
Internet is a clean fit in the First Amendment, two-speaker framework. See Yemini,
supra note 18, at 41-49.
188
Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
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heightened scrutiny.189 The Supreme Court has also taken the
position, however, that when speech and conduct are “joined in a
single course of action,” there must be a balancing between First
Amendment protections and broader societal interests.190
On its face, issues of accessibility fit more neatly into
the classical sense of content-neutral regulation. But in fact,
accessibility can create both content-specific and contentneutral restrictions. In Comcast, the network management
technology at issue did not affect categories of content, but
rather modes of transfer.191 In fact, Comcast is very clear that
the content of information it transmits is not inspected.192
Comcast’s definition of content, however, may be too narrow in
this discussion. Content’s definition is rapidly changing in the
world of electronic files and digital conveyance of information.
The authorship of an electronic document is said by many to
yield a privilege under the doctrine of attorney work product.193
This would indicate that law regards protocol tags and
metadata as document content, treating such tags the same
way as a law firm’s internal memoranda.194 Comcast’s definition
also fails to recognize that impeding one type of file transfer
could disproportionately affect a category of content associated
with that transfer. For example, ISPs could easily identify—
and in turn limit or de-prioritize—online gaming tags, which
are distinguishable among others.195 It would be difficult to
argue that such a practice is “content-neutral”; the practice
appears to directly target a category of speech.196 Furthermore,
189

Id.
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc. 476 U.S. 488, 495 (1986)
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
191
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
192
Comcast Description, supra note 88, at 7.
193
The American Bar Association has ethical rules regarding the inadvertent
disclosure of metadata, or the “data about data” (author, date of authorship, etc.) in an
electronic document. See generally Joshua J. Poje, Metadata Ethics Opinions Around
the U.S., ABA, http://www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/fyidocs/metadatachart.html (last
updated July 20, 2011).
194
Similar to metadata, the Second Circuit concluded in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), that computer code is in fact
“speech” under the First Amendment. Id. at 445. In determining whether restriction of
code was content-neutral, the court also noted whether the “regulated activity is
sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the
First . . . Amendment.” Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). Information
packets clearly fall within these parameters.
195
See Wu, supra note 62, at 168 (noting that ISPs could block online gaming
through application information).
196
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents
thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”). In fact, ISPs
190
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lazy packet inspection to reduce congestion may sweep up
unintended content.197 Courts should analyze any of these
situations under a traditional, heightened scrutiny if the enduser does not explicitly agree to the specific practice.
b. Public Forums, the Right to Access Information, and
the Free Flow of Ideas
In the modern age, where corporate media operate as
gatekeepers to several of the most accessible means of relaying
information, some have suggested a contextual approach to
First Amendment protection, one—in contrast to the
traditional view that the First Amendment is a restriction on
what actors cannot proscribe—which asks informational
gatekeepers to create opportunities for expression to be
heard.198 Indeed, “[a] realistic view of the first amendment
requires recognition that a right of expression is somewhat thin
if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of
mass communications.”199 This approach applies more neatly
than the traditional approach discussed above.
The contextual, or affirmative, construction of the First
Amendment was most famously declared by Justice Black:
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a
condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government
itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-

including Comcast have not maintained complete integrity in shaping traffic without
any consideration of content. In a clear example of content-based discrimination,
Comcast was found censoring e-mails sent from antiwar groups on two separate
occasions. NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 5-7. In another instance, Comcast blocked
access to Gmail and Google for their Boston subscribers, suggesting that subscribers
switch over to Comcast e-mail. Id. at 11.
197
Comcast’s data regulation technology, for example, creates session
thresholds for P2P applications specifically, without considering whether an overall
traffic threshold is met. Comcast Description, supra note 88, at 8-9. In effect, P2P
protocols are identified and limited without consideration of the overall strain on the
network, simply because these protocols are known to cause congestion.
198
See Post, supra note 19, at 183 (“Even speech that seems on its surface
irrelevant to politics . . . serves to focus and clarify public values and commitments.
That is why constitutional protection should be extended to media of
communication . . . .”); Barron, supra note 23, at 1655-56 (“Today ideas reach the
millions largely to the extent they are permitted entry into the great metropolitan
dailies, news magazines, and broadcasting networks. . . . As a constitutional theory of
the communication of ideas, laissez faire is mainfestly [sic] irrelevant.”).
199
Barron, supra note 23, at 1648 (1967). Barron’s work, though it precedes
the issue addressed in this note, is eerily relevant.
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governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.200

The role of government as a speech enhancer, contemplated by
Justice Black, shifts the focus of the First Amendment from
protecting the speaker to protecting the listener.201 It is supported
in part by the doctrines of public forum, common carriage, and
fairness.202 Henry Perritt has found additional support for a right
to access cyberspace through common carrier requirements, the
antitrust essential facilities doctrine, and contract law.203 Under
this affirmative theory, preserving the free flow of ideas will differ
when discussing radio as opposed to television, or newspaper as
opposed to the Internet: each medium has a distinct abundance of
resources and only a certain number of adequate alternative
forms of expression that competently yield the same
communicative effect.204 Therefore, the Internet’s unique
characteristics must be considered when determining the mode
and extent of the government’s intervention.
Although an intermediary’s right to broadcast and
editorialize the information it chooses conflicts with the right to
access lawful content, such a right has been recognized and
furthered by the FCC and the Supreme Court alike.205 In Red
200

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (emphasis added);
see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive
to the will of the people and that charges may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”).
201
“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything
worth saying shall be said.” Post, supra note 19, at 181 (quoting ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26
(1960)); see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (“Free
speech carries with it some freedom to listen.”).
202
NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 41. The constitutionality of the fairness
doctrine is addressed at length in Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969).
Though common carriage is not explicitly mentioned in the Telecommunications Act
common carrier designation, it has been argued that Internet services meet the legal
standard for a common carriage industry. See generally James B. Speta, A Common
Carrier Approach to Internet Connection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225 (2002).
203
Perritt, supra note 162, at 61-62. For a brief discussion of the feasibility of
federal protection under antitrust and common carriage doctrines, see supra Part II.A.
The essential facilities doctrine, which explicitly emerged in the 1970s, allows courts to
issue injunctive relief requiring monopolists to open “irreproducible bottleneck
resources” to their rivals. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 38, at 1828-29.
204
Barron, supra note 23, at 1650-53; see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The moving picture screen, the radio, the
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers.”). Supreme Court jurisprudence supports this
conception of the First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)
(discussing the roles history, scarcity, and invasiveness play in informing First
Amendment protection).
205
See infra Part III.B.2.a.
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Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,206 for example, a radio broadcaster
challenged the constitutionality of the FCC’s “fairness doctrine”
and related regulations, which required “reply time” for those who
were personally attacked over the airwaves.207 The doctrine was
designed to further two main duties held by broadcast licensees:
to “give adequate coverage to public issues” and to create fair
coverage that “accurately reflects the opposing views.”208 Faced
with a First Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court reasoned
that Congress, and in turn the FCC, has the authority to regulate
broadcast licensees’ conveyance of information due to the scarcity
of the medium and “the legitimate claims of those unable without
governmental assistance to gain access to [radio] frequencies for
expression of their views.”209
Though the fairness doctrine is no longer in effect, Red
Lion implicitly upholds a normative right held by the public to
access all viewpoints through commonly used media and
government’s authority to enact, in its power, what is
necessary to effect that access given the nature of the
medium.210 Boiled down, the fairness doctrine’s practical
ramification is an extension of affirmative First Amendment
obligations on private broadcasters. The Supreme Court would
later find that the Internet lacks the scarcity concerns posed by
the radio spectrum,211 but the effect on the right to access is
nearly identical when Internet users are blocked from
accessing online information. That is, limitation on the
accessibility of an online discussion board or blog would be
substantially similar to the limitations imposed by
broadcasters that impede access to the free flow of ideas.
Legally speaking, however, the standard of review for
an impediment to access is not entirely clear. And moreover,
the Supreme Court has shown signs of scaling back its right-toaccess interpretation of the First Amendment. In American
Library Ass’n v. United States,212 the Supreme Court ruled that
library-provided Internet was not a traditional public forum
206
207

395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Id. at 373-75 (quoting 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (repealed

1987)).
208

Id. at 377.
Id. at 389, 400-01.
210
See id. at 390 (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhabited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market.” (citing Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
211
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
212
539 U.S. 194 (2003).
209
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and therefore held that congressional legislation imposing
limitations on library Internet access was constitutional under
reduced scrutiny.213 As the Court stated, a public library “provides
Internet access, not to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers, . . . but for the same reasons it offers other library
resources: to facilitate research, learning, and recreational
pursuits.”214 The Court’s interpretation of public forums appears,
however, not to be a wholesale exclusion of the Internet, but
rather a narrow interpretation of library-offered Internet.215
Indeed, when it comes to accessing primary sources
online, outside of a library, recent events illustrate how the
Internet may provide exclusive means to access some forms of
information, thereby deserving a greater degree of protection.216
After the Iranian election of 2009 was met with popular unrest,
Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook exploded with content
exposing the violent turmoil, which was otherwise limited from
exportation.217 In fact, some observers reported that news
stations needed the Twitter and YouTube content to cover
Iran’s protests.218 The Iran protests demonstrate that the
Internet provides the potential for a direct conduit between
public events and society—an important, unintermediated, and
informative experience worthy of protection.219
When adjudicating issues of free expression, courts
sometimes weigh the information sought as well.220 It would
flout the central policy of constitutional protection to contend
213

NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 81-82 (citing Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194).
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206.
215
See id. at 205 (“Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’
nor a ‘designated’ public form.” (emphasis added)).
216
Cf. Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 847-48 (1974) (reasoning that prison
policy banning face-to-face meetings with inmates by unaffiliated individuals was not
violation of First Amendment, in part, because journalists can attain information from
prisons in other ways besides face-to-face interviews).
217
Brad Stone & Noam Cohen, Social Networks Spread Defiance Online, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/
middleeast/16media.html?_r=1.
218
Twitter 1, CNN 0, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/13856224?story_id=13856224.
219
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the
press’s access to a criminal trial is protected under the First Amendment. 448 U.S. 555,
580 (1980). Important to that holding was the Court’s reasoning regarding the role of
the press, which “contribute[s] to public understanding of the rule of law” by “supplying
the representations or reality of the real life drama once available only in the
courtroom.” Id. at 572-73.
220
Compare Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting the
important press function in accessing information toward “preserving free public
discussion of governmental affairs”), with Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569
(concluding that the function of a public trial is indispensible in American law).
214
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that Internet access should be guaranteed to access unlawful
information.221 Furthermore, unfettered access to unlawful or
harmful content would create congestion over ISP networks that
could substantially decrease accessibility to other, lawful
content.222 Even in the context of free expression, the First
Amendment does not offer protection to obscenity, defamation,
and incitement.223 In recent discussion, there has been some
attack on the Internet site WikiLeaks224 for how it potentially
compromises national security.225 But the general principle should
hold for WikiLeaks and the like: the government has a “heavy
burden” to justify prior restraint on the spread of information;226
dissemination of such information should only be restrained if it
would “gravely prejudice the defense interests of the United
States or result in irreparable injury to the United States.”227
That said, the notion that courts ought to make value
judgments with respect to speech is inherently suspect. Indeed,
recent First Amendment jurisprudence seems to reject this
approach outright.228 But the separation of powers easily
provides a counterbalance. In making a cause of action for endusers, Congress can use constitutional jurisprudence to
circumscribe the “lawful content”229 to which a litigant can seek
access.230 In turn, value judgments would not be left to judicial
discretion, but rather to carefully detailed, bright-line rules.

221

The First Amendment historically does not protect obscenity, Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), or “fighting words,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942), for example.
222
See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
223
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
224
WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
225
See Greg Miller, CIA Launches Task Force to Assess Impact of U.S. Cables’
Exposure by WikiLeaks, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:24 AM), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/21/AR2010122104599.html?
hpid=topnews&sid=ST2010122105304.
226
N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
227
United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir.), aff’d, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
228
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free
speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits.”).
229
This language is pulled from the Net Neutrality Order as a primer for the
base-level protections the cause-of-action could seek to protect. See Net Neutrality
Order, supra note 17, at 17,906.
230
See infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
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2. Rights of ISPs
a. First Amendment Protection for Conduit Speech
Just as the First Amendment affords protection to
individual speakers, it also affords protection to commercial
enterprises, or conduits, that carry individuals’ speech.231 In cable
television, for instance, the Supreme Court has held that
editorial discretion in selecting content under its services is
within the scope of First Amendment protection.232 Similarly, a
public library’s decision to exclude materials does not trigger
heightened scrutiny.233 In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,234
a cable television case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a congressional act requiring cable operators to relay
local broadcasts was an infringement on the freedom of speech
or of the press.235 The Court applied intermediate scrutiny to the
Act,236 stating first that laws singling out a medium are subject
“to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment
scrutiny,”237 then concluding that the Act was content neutral.238
The FCC and others have argued that intermediate
scrutiny should likewise apply to a federal neutrality
mandate.239 But cases dealing with media suggest that the First
Amendment interests of media consumers outweigh the
providers’ interests at some point, proportional in part to how
much of a speech “conduit” the provider is.240 Important to recall
231

See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (“Cable
programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled
to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment.”).
232
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)
(concluding that expression by a cable operator includes “exercising editorial discretion
over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire”).
233
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 208 (1993).
234
512 U.S. 622.
235
Id. at 626.
236
Id. at 661-62.
237
Id. at 640-41.
238
Id. at 622, 647. Some have argued that the standard of review was
“intermediate plus,” where it “decidedly privileges speech rights over values.” Yemini,
supra note 18, at 25 (quoting Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The
First Amendment at War With Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2007)).
239
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,983; Yemini, supra note 18, at
20-22. Yemini argues that, similar to a cable operator, an ISP would just as easily
engage in protected expression under Turner by blocking a website, for example. Id. at
18-20. In fact, Yemini suggests, to argue that ISPs do not engage in protected editorial
discretion would be a contradictory position for net neutrality activists, where such
discretion is essentially the conduct in question when engaging in data discrimination.
Id. at 18-19.
240
NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 138 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
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is that the First Amendment’s protections vary with the
carrying medium.241 Unlike cable television, Internet content is
primarily created by end-users. Even the largest corporate
content providers are search engines and social networking
sites, which derive most of their Internet traffic from end-user
contributions. Furthermore, the type of “editorial discretion”
argued by ISPs “bears little resemblance to an editor’s choosing
which programs [like in cable television] . . . to carry.”242 The
FCC went further in its Net Neutrality Order to say that no
court has ever “suggested that regulation of common carriage
requirements triggers First Amendment scrutiny.”243
Nevertheless, Wu and Lessig appear to be correct in
that the governmental interests furthered by promoting
neutrality are “important or substantial”244 enough to withstand
intermediate scrutiny by the courts.245 As stated by the Turner
Court, “assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest
order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”246
Indeed, when weighing conduits’ First Amendment interests
against society’s in the free flow of ideas, the freedom of
expression is at least as heavy as the freedom of editorial
discretion under an affirmative conception of the First
Amendment.247 But the cases also suggest that editorial
discretion qualifies for greater protection as a service provider
241

“[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them.” Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 386.
Greater latitude is allowed in infringing on First Amendment rights in broadcast-radio
regulation. Id. Very little latitude is granted in regulating print. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
242
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,983; see also Comcast Order, supra
note 87, at 13,033 (“Unlike newspapers or radio or broadcast television . . . the Internet
gives Americans ‘a great degree of control over the information that they receive.’”).
243
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,983. But see id. at 18,073-74
n.114 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Robert M. McDowell).
244
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
245
Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 10. The interests put forward include
“promoting the widespread dissemination of information” and “promoting fair
competition in the market.” Id. The FCC agrees with this reasoning in its Net
Neutrality Order, but it provides somewhat different interests. Net Neutrality Order,
supra note 17, at 17,984 (relating the important government interests that would pass
intermediate scrutiny, such as “consumer choice, end-user control, free expression, and
the freedom to innovate without permission”).
246
Turner, 512 U.S. at 663.
247
See Barron, supra note 23, at 1654-55 (quoting Associated Press v. United
States, 320 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). But see Yoo, supra note 18, at 702 (“[I]n terms of deciding
how that balance [between edge users and providers] should be struck, the cases
indicate that free speech considerations favor preserving intermediaries’ editorial
discretion unless the relevant technologies fall within a narrow range of exceptions, all
of which the Court has found to be inapplicable to the Internet.”).
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becomes less interested in the content of the expression being
conveyed.248 From the vantage point of an Internet subscriber,
Internet carriers should be disinterested in lawful content
transmitted over their networks.
b. Fifth Amendment Takings
Another argument presented against the neutrality
mandate is that governmental action would be a confiscatory
taking under Fifth Amendment249 doctrine.250 The argument
suggests that a limitation on network management practices
would in turn limit the profitability of the broadband industry,
or the choice to engage in new business models.251 When
assessing whether a taking occurs, courts look to interference
with “investment-backed expectations,” the “economic impact of
the regulation,” and “the character of the government action.”252
The FCC found in its Net Neutrality Order, however, that the
Fifth Amendment challenges are without merit. The FCC stated
that “takings law makes clear that property owners cannot, as a
general matter, expect that existing legal requirements
regarding their property will remain entirely unchanged.”253
Case law seems to support the FCC’s finding as it
relates to exercise of First Amendment rights. In assessing
whether allowing demonstrators to handbill in a shopping
248

Henry Perritt observes:

The First Amendment permits forcing some information conduits to accept
content generated by others, but only when such forcing is necessary to
permit the content to find its audience. When the entity burdened by the duty
has relatively little interest in expression, for example if it is simply a router,
the First Amendment allows a broader range of legislative and regulatory
discretion to impose a duty because the harm to First Amendment interests
is minimal.
Perritt, supra note 162, at 94; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.”).
249
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
250
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,985-86; see also Lyons, supra
note 62, at 92-95; Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network
Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and
Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 667 (2008); Perritt,
supra note 162, at 93.
251
See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 62, at 95. Lyons also argues that the Net
Neutrality Rules could be a per se Fifth Amendment taking under the permanent
physical occupation doctrine of Loretto. Id. at 92-94.
252
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,985 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
253
Id.
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center was a “taking,” the Supreme Court stated in Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins that the true test to determine
whether the public has—through state-granted free speech
protections—confiscated property rights of an owner is whether
the restriction “forc[es] some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”254 Applying that test, the shopping
center’s Fifth Amendment claim failed because the owner could
not show unreasonable impairment on value or use of his
property, especially where the demonstrators were orderly and
remained in common areas.255
In the case of Internet accessibility, the benefit lost from
ISPs’ data management practices would burden the entire
industry. The government’s intervention would also not
substantially limit the capability of the providers to compete.
Moreover, the obligation to carry content without discrimination
does not infringe on any physical space, so the challenge is
inherently limited.256
That is not to say that a Fifth Amendment challenge is
completely without merit. It is at least foreseeable that a court
could find reasonable a business model where ISPs compete
over providing greater access to Internet content.257 In fact,
modern-day consumers analogously subscribe to cable packages
that function similarly—providers compete to provide bundled
packages of content that suit the needs of the consumer.
Furthermore, an overbearing and blanket prohibition of data
discrimination could actually serve the opposite effect it
intends if ISPs do not deploy new Internet infrastructure: a
pure nondiscrimination mandate could sacrifice the ability to
access content effectively for outright connectivity.258 If ISPs
cannot meet their burden of providing the requisite QoS to
their subscribers, then sites that demand high bandwidth will
254

447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,

49 (1960)).
255

Id. at 83-84.
Perritt, supra note 162, at 93-94 (citing Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24
F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (invalidating order by FCC to allot office space of local
telephone carriers to competing carriers)). But see Lyons, supra note 62, at 93 (arguing
that mandated neutrality would allow a continuous right by content providers to
“physically invade broadband networks with their electronic signals and permanently
occupy portions of network capacity”).
257
See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 502 (discussing the disincentive of
network providers to engage in data discrimination).
258
In other words, at odds with one another are the rights to connectivity and
a “public interest in quality infrastructure.” Perritt, supra note 162, at 58.
256
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not be available to users on that network, implicating the very
problem that net neutrality seeks to remedy and decreasing
service efficiency for ISPs.259
C.

Hurdles to Litigation

The previous section shows that there is some doctrinal
basis under which a court could adjudicate the facts of an enduser litigation. Though informative to norms that should be
considered in constructing a cause of action, the jurisprudence
on its own is not self-executing in this context. Two doctrines
are particularly noteworthy hurdles to litigation: state action
and standing. Their respective merits and problems will be
assessed here.
1. Arguing State Action
As Christopher Yoo has argued, “[I]nvoking [the] First
Amendment as requiring governmental intervention to redress
private power would stand the First Amendment on its head.”260
In other words, the First Amendment is a protection against
intrusion by the government, not by private actors.261 That is
not to say, though, that constitutional restrictions cannot be
imposed on private actors.262 Under Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, for example, the Court has held that private
actors may be bound by constitutional obligations when the
state judiciary enforces racially discriminatory restrictive
259

Put differently, the issue of Internet access as a right is enforced by
blanket prohibitions at the risk of creating a critical mass: complete deregulation gives
ISPs the power to unduly discriminate against content, while over-regulation may
make the content inaccessible to begin with. This effect would undermine the service
the ISPs intend to provide. “We have a public network that is indeed a great creative
commons for data applications, but it is less so for any application that requires a
minimum quality of service. True application neutrality may, in fact, sometimes
require a close vertical relationship between a broadband operator and Internet service
provider.” Wu, supra note 62, at 148.
260
Yoo, supra note 18, at 700.
261
Id.
262
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Supreme Court held that a
restaurant that leased space from a Wilmington, Delaware, parking facility was a state
actor because in leasing space from the city authority, and being maintained by public
funds, the restaurant was “an integral part of a public building devoted to a public
parking service.” 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968) (applying the Thirteenth Amendment to private actors); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same). Warranting further
discussion, courts have in the past considered First Amendment rights of defendants
sued under right of publicity claims. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996).
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covenants.263 In the context of Internet litigation, however,
there is some indication that judges are reluctant to extend the
state action classification to ISPs outright.264
Nonetheless, there is an argument that ISPs may fall
directly within the parameters of the state action doctrine, in
turn allowing for direct constitutional enforcement. The Third
and Fourth Circuits have stated that there are three distinct
tests utilized by the Supreme Court to assess whether a private
actor has crossed the line into state action. First, the court may
consider whether the entity has “exercised powers that are
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state” (or, in short,
the “public function” test). Second, the court may ask whether
“the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with
state officials.” And in the final test, the court may determine
whether “[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with . . . [the acting party] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”265
Public “insinuation” may be present in the Internet’s
origins, where the initial connection of networks creating the
Internet was instituted in large part by the federal
government. In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,266
the Supreme Court ruled, for First Amendment purposes, that
Amtrak was a government actor subject to the limitations
dictated by the Constitution.267 In reaching its decision, the
Court compared Amtrak—a statutorily created rail service held
through private stock268—with other government corporations
like the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat).269
Similar to Amtrak, Comsat was created by the federal
government, yet it is “capitalized entirely with private funds.”270
The Internet was developed under circumstances similar to
those of Amtrak and Comsat. Through the 1960s, one of the
initial networks giving rise to the Internet, the Advanced
263

See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1948) (holding that judicial
enforcement of racially discriminatory restrictions is state action that warrants
Fourteenth Amendment challenge). Here, portions of the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 201, 230(b), 256, 601, as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit in Comcast,
600 F.3d 642, imposes similar restraint on the freedom of expression for Internet users.
264
See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 444
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that AOL is not a state actor).
265
Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141-43 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993)).
266
513 U.S. 374 (1995).
267
Id. at 400.
268
Id. at 385.
269
Id. at 390-91.
270
Id. at 390.
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Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), was funded
and developed by the Department of Defense for research
purposes.271 The National Science Foundation (NSF), a federal
agency created by Congress, extended the network connection
to U.S. universities and beyond the realm of defense research.272
One of the first national backbone infrastructures was, in turn,
created by the NSF in 1992.273
The government is also largely responsible for
implementing the uniform system of packet-traffic management
currently controlled by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN).274 The federal government
established ICANN in 1998, privatizing the root server system
that informs subordinate servers of IP addresses.275 Without that
arrangement, the Internet would have potentially grown into a
set of redundant and conflicting internetworks.276 This fact is
particularly relevant when considering the constitutional
treatment of packet and network traffic management; though
Internet services are provided by private actors, this does not
detract from the clearly public origins that suggest a “close
nexus”277 between Internet services and federal action.
The public function test, considered in conjunction with
the joint participation of government action in private
enterprises, also provides meaningful guidance in determining
the public nature of Internet control. Marsh v. Alabama278
expresses the principle that the more a private party opens his
property to the function of the public, “the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights who use it.”279 In simple terms, the public function test
states that, at some point, private owners provide access to a
property so fundamentally public in nature that the owners
271

A Brief History of NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=103050 (last visited July 31, 2011).
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
See STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
914 (2d ed. 2006).
275
Id.
276
See Improvement of Technical Management of Names and Addresses, 63
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begin to owe an obligation to protect “identical interests” to
those held by citizens of a state or municipality.280
In Altmann v. Television Signal Corp.,281 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
ruled that the defendant cable company was a “state actor” for
the purposes of a constitutional challenge. The court used
language to suggest that it assessed state action based on the
government’s participation in empowering the company to
censor indecent public-access programming.282 Interestingly, the
Altmann Court also noted the important function of publicaccess channels “to serve as public forums, accessible to all
interests, including those that may otherwise lack the
resources to communicate through electronic media.”283 The
court, in turn, concluded that the effect of allowing cable
operators to block indecent material on these stations would
likely fail strict scrutiny.284 This decision seems to apply here on
two different levels, suggesting, first, that the government has
a duty to preserve public forums in broadcast media, or,
alternatively, that the government has imposed enough
obligation on the cable operator to subsume its private
interests.285 Marsh and Altmann considered in tandem present
the possibility that courts may be willing to extend the state
action doctrine in issues of First Amendment freedom where,
as in Altmann, largely public functions are subjected to the
requirements of facilitating public forums and where, as in
Marsh, the private intermediaries that own the medium of
expression have opened the medium to public discourse. To be
sure, the Court has never ruled that the Internet is a
traditional public forum,286 but, in any event, the
unintermediated debate the Internet holds strongly indicates
that it ought to be. Indeed, except to the extent limited by nonneutrality, the Internet is a wide-open resource of access to
information—suggesting its similarity to a sidewalk or square
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Id. at 507. But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976) (narrowly
construing Marsh).
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849 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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Id. at 1342-43.
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Id. at 1340.
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Id. at 1343.
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See id. at 1342 (“Congress stripped cable operators of any editorial control
over constitutionally protected speech.”).
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The Court touched on the issue in United States v. American Library Ass’n,
but the holding appears limited to the circumstances of library-provided Internet. See
supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.

428

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

deserving of public-function protection, even though controlled
by private actors.287
That being said, and in all fairness, the appropriate
application of state action to ISPs is one that may be novel to
normal constitutional discourse. Lawrence Lessig writes:
Architectures constitute cyberspace; these architectures are varied;
they variously embed political values; some of these values have
constitutional import. Yet for the most part—and fortunately—these
architectures are private. They are constructed by universities or
corporations and implemented on wires no longer funded by the
Defense Department. They are private and therefore traditionally
outside the scope of constitutional review. The constitutional values
of privacy, access, rights of anonymity, and equality need not trouble
this new world, since this world is “private” and the Constitution is
concerned only with “state action.”
Why this should be is not clear to me. If code functions as law, then
we are creating the most significant new jurisdiction since the
Louisiana Purchase. Yet we are building it just outside the
Constitution’s review. Indeed, we are building it just so that the
Constitution will not govern—as if we want to be free of the
constraints of value embedded by that tradition.288

But if courts were to extend constitutional review to the
issue at hand without legislation, Lessig is right to note that
constitutional theory may not clearly provide the proper
context.289 Other modes of speech are easily divided into two
distinct and opposing forces: the government and the speaker.290
The Internet, by contrast, is inherently a multispeaker,291 multiinterest, or multilateral environment, mediated by
287
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290
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14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 137, 162 (2007), available at
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(“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”
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edge user contributions for any single entry. Wikipedia: About, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). Unlike the
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information over the Internet.
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nongovernmental actors.292 In the multispeaker environment of
the Internet, the free flow of ideas cannot be protected if liberty
interests are evaluated in a two-speaker forum, because there
are tiers of speakers and expressive interests present293: edge
users submit and access content; corporate content and
application providers engineer methods to access their content
and that of edge users; and ISPs deliver the resources to make
all the above interactions possible.294 The government, after the
Comcast decision, is only a limited overseer in this situation.
Though perhaps an activist-oriented position, this
multitiered system suggests that rather than using precedent
based in a bilateral system, we should be evaluating competing
communicative interests irrespective of the state-like
characteristics of these intermediary entities.295 Addressing the
state action doctrine under this method promotes beneficial
cultural values, granting to legal discourse symbolic
statements upon which to base decisions of right and wrong,
and freeing the categorical approach of decisions from what, in
turn, becomes an arbitrary public/private distinction.296
2. Standing to Sue and Problems of Pleading
An Internet subscriber may also face problems bringing
their claims in federal court due to issues of standing and
pleading. Unless the recipient of information knows by some
other means that he or she is expecting data, there is
insufficient information to proceed with an action on the basis
that an ISP is limiting or degrading service.297 Without factual
support, a litigant would have difficulty meeting the
heightened pleading standards of the federal court system,
292
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“Mass-media speech implicates a broader range of free speech values that
include interests of audiences and intermediaries, as well as speakers.” Yoo, supra note
18, at 701.
295
Yemini suggests a normative approach to assessing conflicting rights.
Yemini, supra note 18, at 54.
296
Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation 1295-96 (Univ. of
Conn. Sch. of Law Articles and Working Papers, Paper No. 9, 2000), available at
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which require a statement of the claim that is “plausible on its
face.”298 Even if the case can survive pleading, a litigant must
still show a “concrete and particularized injury” that is “not
conjectural or hypothetical” in order to have standing to sue in
federal court.299 This is a difficult burden in the context of
Internet accessibility; any number of errors, circumstances, or
other factors could contribute to the degradation or blockage of
service. Then again, injury may be more easily shown in
challenging an ISP’s tiering access, which today is the more
widely utilized form of limitation.300
An end-user cannot, therefore, sue with an adequate
basis if transparency is not preserved. Transparency, as noted
by the FCC, “increases the likelihood . . . that the Internet
community will identify problematic conduct and suggest
fixes.”301 As suggested below, the FCC must maintain its role in
issuing orders of transparency if litigants will have an
opportunity to properly plead their cases and discover the harm
giving rise to them.
IV.

PROPOSED ACTION

If courts were to adjudicate a right to access Internet
content through litigation, issues of state action and standing
would likely stop the actions in their tracks. Congress must
legislate outright that unreasonably impeding access to lawful
Internet content gives rise to a private right of action in federal
courts.302 Congress should be specific as to what constitutes a per
se violation, using First Amendment jurisprudence and the
FCC’s recent Net Neutrality Order as a guide in determining
which practices should be banned outright.303 But the legislation
should also give sufficient leeway to courts to adjudicate
circumstances specific to the technology, conduct, and
information at issue. Congress must also make explicit in this
legislation that the courts have jurisdiction to issue a wide array
298

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v.
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Cong. § 12(e)(1) (2007).
303
See id. at 17,941-51 (prohibiting blocking and unreasonable discrimination).

2011] PROTECTING A RIGHT TO ACCESS INTERNET CONTENT

431

of equitable relief—an end-user litigant is unlikely to incur
actual money damages. Equitable relief will serve well to take
the place of the FCC’s power to issue orders. Beyond the federal
court system, the FCC must maintain its role as a diligent
overseer of transparency. Transparency will enable end-users to
make informed, specific, and plausible claims against ISPs.
A.

The Specifics of Legislation

Congress can certainly outlaw data management
practices and pricing schemes that infringe on the interests of
end-users through its power to regulate interstate commerce.304
Legislating on issues of constitutional right, even without an
explicit provision in the Constitution allowing for this, is not a
shaky proposition either.305 The legislation must guide a court
hearing a network discrimination challenge, instructing the
judge to weigh the individual’s right to access the information
sought with the reasonableness of the data management
practice or the tiering scheme.
In its Comcast Order the FCC sought to impose a new
standard for adjudicating network management challenges:
“[An ISP’s] practice should further a critically important
interest and be narrowly or carefully tailored to serve that
interest.”306 The FCC’s proposed standard, however, is too
stringent to accommodate ISPs’ interest; any standard utilized
should not sanction ISPs for failing to exercise the least
restrictive means possible in every instance of managing their
networks. In fact, the FCC would later scale back its “narrowly
tailored” standard because it “overly constrain[ed] network
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
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engineering decisions”307 and failed to consider that “reasonable
network management practices may differ across platforms.”308
To preserve the property and speech interests of ISPs
and yet still keep users from facing undue discrimination,
legislation should adopt an intermediate standard of review.309
That is, network providers must show an important interest in
utilizing challenged data management practices, and the
practice should be substantially related to that interest.310
Applying intermediate scrutiny comports with the conduit
speech assessed in Turner311 and is consistent with the
conclusions of the FCC in its recent Net Neutrality Order.312
What “reasonable” network management is—and conversely,
what unreasonable discrimination is not—poses a question
that cannot be addressed at length here. But even where a
system of interest-balancing is appropriate, bright-line
categories of conduct are inherently unlawful. The FCC, in its
rules to preserve the open Internet, has laid out some methods
that weigh towards unreasonable discrimination on the one
hand313 and reasonable network management on the other.314
Congress should look to these definitions and set out conduct
that is unlawful per se. Consistent with First Amendment
principles,315 Congress should at the very least contemplate
prohibiting ISP conduct that impedes access to lawful and
307
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nonharmful content and degrades provision of services that
compete with services provided by the ISP.
Congress must also guide courts in considering the
weight accorded to the information sought by plaintiffs.
Needless to say, information that would not normally enjoy
First Amendment protection should not fall within the statute.
But the Internet is home to many frivolous—and perhaps
harmful—enterprises that may be protected speech. While
Internet resources are not as scarce as broadcast radio
frequencies,316 for example, they are still not unlimited.
Unimpeded access to pornographic content (though protected
under normal First Amendment jurisprudence, if not obscene)317
may therefore be granted at the expense of access to other
information that has a direct benefit to society.318 The end-user
is left back at square one if courts consistently uphold these
access challenges—a degradation of service to access the
Internet content of one’s choice. Congress should therefore
provide that impeding access to certain categories of content—
carefully circumscribed in the legislation for being indecent,
threatening, or harmful—is actionable only if the defendant
ISP’s access restrictions also sweep up other lawful content
that Congress does not set out.
No congressional bill to date has accounted for end-user
and ISP interests to the extent advocated in this note. Nor has a
bill constructed a private right of action that stands in federal
courts. Congress should create that right of action and mandate
that the following examples of ISP conduct are significant or
important network management and pricing interests319:
• Preserving the privacy and security of end-user
information and hardware;
• Providing unimpeded access to the content of an enduser’s choice, including but not limited to network
management to maintain standard QoS for highbandwidth web applications, so long as providing such
access does not throttle or prioritize one form of lawful
content over another;
316
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Allowing end-users to attach devices and use software
that limit their own Internet accessibility to the extent
end-users desire;
Complying with other applicable federal or state law.

This list is not exhaustive. To preserve this bill’s application to
circumstances currently unforeseeable, the judiciary must be
entitled to consider other important interests identified by ISP
defendants. But under no circumstances should an ISP’s
interest in procuring a profit be sufficient, unless the network
management or pricing scheme at issue only incidentally gains
a profit in furthering one of the above-stated objectives.
Finally, Congress should, at the very least, indicate that
impeding access to any content that is not protected under the
First Amendment does not give rise to an end-user challenge.
B.

The FCC’s Continued Role in Transparency

Congress should also grant the FCC the authority to
serve as an arbiter of transparency in ISP data management.
In the Comcast proceedings, the FCC issued orders asking for
more detailed illustrations of network management practices.320
The FCC should continue to use this power to play network
management inspector. The FCC has the technical knowledge
and resources to monitor the transparency of ISPs’ network
management practices, and they are therefore better equipped
to determine whether ISPs are being fully forthcoming in
informing the public. Continued transparency in the market
will keep information regarding ISPs in the open so litigants
can file in court with a basis upon which to make allegations.
***

In conclusion, the reader should note that the model
proposed here is not one that would replace the regulatory power of
administrative law. It is rather designed as a countermajoritarian
check on legislative and administrative solutions that have
provided insufficient consideration of individual interests in
Internet-content access. This new cause of action can serve to
supplement any regulation with individual action—granting an
avenue of remedy that is based in the conservative and (more)
stable doctrines upheld by the Constitution. This additional mode
320
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of remedy will not only put greater pressure on ISPs to preserve
individual rights, but it can also serve as a barometer of consumer
welfare in the Internet market.
CONCLUSION
The trend of recognizing access to Internet content as a
right is important if United States citizens want to hold the
power to access information and use the Internet as a speaking
platform. The fact that other nations have adopted such a right
is informative of international sentiment, but does not
necessarily reflect the reality of American law. Traditional
constitutional protections of the First Amendment (though not
readily applicable to the right-to-access issue) evoke a
possibility that litigation based in constitutional norms may
serve as a mode of individual remedy, and further, as a form of
pressure to exert upon Internet service providers. There are
indeed major hurdles to this form of regulation: the outdated
and draconian state action doctrine; an individual litigant’s
difficulty in alleging or proving a plausible scheme to reduce
accessibility; and the First and Fifth Amendment rights of ISPs
in protecting their interests as conduits and enterprises of
speech. The model proposed here allows for litigation on this
topic and preserves transitory regulatory power held by federal
courts until a new regime is fashioned. But that power rests on
legislative action. In the meantime, U.S. citizens are left with
little recourse or remedy to protect any theoretical right to
access Internet content. Therefore, the potential for
disempowerment of the populace remains.
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